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SUPPORTING DOCUMENT NO. 27

MINUTES OF MEETING
BRIEFING FOR SECRETARY McNAMARA
ON SATELLITE DETECTION, INSPECTION AND NEGOTIATION
BY

JOHN WHITMAN, DDR&E (AD)
27 JUNE 1963


PRINCIPLES IN ATTENDANCE

Secretary McNamara	OSD
Dr. Harold Brown	DDR&E
Mr. Fred Payne, Jr.	DDR&E (AD)
Mr. Larson	Under Secretary of the Army (R&D)
Mr. A. M. Rubenstein	ARPA
General Curtin	AFRDD
Dr. C. W. Herzfeld	ARPA

PROCEEDINGS:

1. WARNINGa. Threat

Considerable time was spent on the various possibilities and potential threats achievable by the Soviet in the next decade. As Dr. Brown stated, it was essentially a



It was

agreed that they had the capability to accomplish this now.

b. Our Capabilities

Based on the evaluation by the JDR&E it was postulated that a wide variety of systems approaches were possible with a great difference in achievable time phasing and costs. These approaches range from a minimum cost of \$100 million to more than \$10 billion. The current quick

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fix approaches, such as ZEUS of the Air Force [REDACTED] follow-on improvements could provide a real capability for intercepting the postulated threat in the near future for some \$300 million dollars.

These costs include improvements to the detection capability. The emphasis was on interception, however, the inspection mission was briefly covered with the conclusions that it was technically achievable. However, it was pointed out that the Air Force was now back to the study stage and that preliminary estimates indicate that a full system effort would cost some \$1 billion.

c. Recommendations

The briefing concluded with the recommendations to (1) proceed with the ZEUS installation at Kwajalein, (2) to implement the [REDACTED] demonstration and to authorize an operational capability based on this proposal and (3) at the completion of the current ARPA studies to make decisions early in 1964 for follow-on operational systems including a possible non-nuclear kill system.

2. DISCUSSION

a. Secretary McNamara stressed that the first priority for efforts in this area was to provide an immediate capability to destroy any postulated Soviet satellite threat. He emphasized his desires in this matter by stressing that he wanted it clearly understood that he wanted the capability to initiate destruction of the satellite by a phone call. The Secretary

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felt that the ZEUS follow-on program as proposed would be in direct

competition and duplication [REDACTED] THOR capability and that he felt there should be only one such system for follow-on operational use.

He felt that the Air Force was and rightfully so, the prime agency in this area. However, the Air Force should take care to look at sea launch of the possible interceptor systems and that in either case, it was up to the service to determine the quantities of missiles and warheads that would be required to provide this capability and that this logically would be updated in accordance with the developments and the threat.

b. The capabilities of the ZEUS installation at Kwajalein were discussed in some detail. The point the Secretary questioned was the response time which was stated to be from [REDACTED]. After some

discussion, it was determined that previous statements by the Army to the effect that a [REDACTED] response was, in fact, based on an improved ZEUS installation. [The THOR installation response time from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was criticized by the Secretary and when it was explained that this was predicated on staging from Vandenberg, the Secretary said that this was unacceptable and did not meet his stated requirement for operational capability.]

c. On a specific point, the Secretary questioned the launch reliability of the THOR system, the point being desirability of solid fuel missile vs

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
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liquid. It was agreed by the principals that solids were desirable and, in fact, the Air Force had considered this for follow-on systems. However, that for near term, the capabilities of the THOR were the only available system with the required range.

d. The subject of SPADATS was discussed in a very cursory manner even though detection and tracking of target satellites is perhaps the most limiting element in response time. Mr. McNamara seemed to be of the opinion that, optimistically, he could expect total response times on the order



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3. SUMMARY

The Secretary of Defense summarized his desires as follows:

a. The US Army should proceed with the Kwajalein ZEUS "quick fix" installation immediately to include provisions for warheads and an on-call satellite destruction capability.

b. The Air Force should proceed immediately with [redacted] demonstration and an operational "quick fix" capability to be effective in June 1964 including warheads to provide an on-call satellite destruction capability.

c. The DDR&E will review all follow-on system proposals and make recommendations to DoD in time to be included in the FY 65 budget (i.e., on or about 15 November 1964). These recommendations will include a primary Service mission assignment for follow-on development of systems for destruction of satellites to include specific details of how that Service would organize its management and operation of such a system.

d. Based on the above decisions, provisions be included in the Fiscal 65 budget for the follow-on system to the "quick fix" systems.

e. That both the Army and the Air Force will provide the Secretary of Defense a realistic appraisal of the time capabilities which the [redacted] and Kwajalein ZEUS "quick fix" systems will have against an agreed-to enemy threat. This appraisal will include an analysis of all parts of the systems (i.e., detection, communications control, interception, reliabilities, etc.).

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